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Abstract
Phase change memory (PCM) technology appears as more
scalable than DRAM technology. As PCM exhibits access
time slightly longer but in the same range as DRAMs, sev-
eral recent studies have proposed to use PCMs for designing
main memory systems. Unfortunately PCM technology suf-
fers from a limited write endurance; typically each memory
cell can be only be written a large but still limited number
of times (107 to 109 writes are reported for current tech-
nology). Till now, research proposals have essentially fo-
cused their attention on designing memory systems that will
survive to the average behavior of conventional applications.
However PCM memory systems should be designed to sur-
vive worst-case applications, i.e., malicious attacks targeting
the physical destruction of the memory through overwriting
a limited number of memory cells.
In this paper, we propose the design of a secure PCM-
based main memory that would by construction survive to
overwrite attacks. In order to prevent a malicious user to
overwrite some memory cells, the physical memory address
(PA) manipulated by the computer system is not the same as
the PCM memory address (PCMA). PCMA is made invis-
ible from the rest of the computer system. The PCM mem-
ory controller is in charge of the PA-to-PCMA translation
. Hiding PCMA alone does not prevent a malicious user
to overwrite a PCM memory word. Therefore in the se-
cure PCM-based main memory, PA-to-PCMA translation is
continuously modified through a random process, such pre-
venting a malicious user to overwrite some PCM memory
words. PCM address invisibility and continuous random PA-
to-PCMA translation ensures security against an overwrit-
ing attack as well it ensures a practical write endurance close
to the theoretical maximum. The hardware overhead needed
to ensure this security in the PCM controller includes a ran-
dom number generator and a medium large address transla-
tion table.
.
1. Introduction
Phase change memory (PCM) technology [4] appears as a
promising technology for designing main memory in future
computer systems [1, 5, 3, 2]. PCM presents advantages over
DRAMs in terms of static energy consumption as well as in-
tegration scalability for future technologies generations; for
instance, [3] anticipates a 4X higher memory density with
PCM than with DRAM. Since PCM presents read access
time in the same range as DRAMs, PCM has been recently
considered as an alternative for designing main memory sys-
tems [1, 5, 3, 2]. Unfortunately, PCM suffers from a limited
write endurance, i.e., a PCMmemory cell can only support a
limited number of writes and exceeding this limit might im-
pair its correct functioning. The reported write endurances
for PCM memory vary between 107 and 109 writes on a sin-
gle cell. Such a limited endurance has been recognized as
a major issue for the design of PCM-based main memory
systems. Several propositions [1, 5, 3, 2] have been made
to allow a PCM main memory to survive the anticipated
lifetime of a computer system, i.e., 10 to 20 years, in the
context of general applications.
The security hole of PCM based main memory.
At the exception of [2], these studies completely ignore
the security breach that the limited write endurance of PCM
components would create in a main memory. Using PCM
components for main memory would create an opportunity
to a malicious attacker to physically destroy the main mem-
ory through a very simple program overwriting the same
memory cells again and again. The potential attack is par-
ticularly simple to mount. It can be run by any user without
any execution privilege.
Qureshi et [2] mention that their Region Based Start Gap
scheme would survive to such a naive overwrite attack con-
sisting in constantly overwriting the same physical mem-
ory address. However in Section 2, we will explain why the
RBSG scheme is not secure.
If this overwrite security breach is not closed then no rea-
sonable computer manufacturer will ever consider PCM for
implementing main memory.
Contribution.
In this paper, we propose the design of a secure main
PCM memory that will not suffer from this security breach.
In order to prevent a malicious user to overwrite some mem-
ory cells, the physical memory address (PA) manipulated by
the computer system is not the same as the PCM memory
address (PCMA) as proposed in [2]. PCMA is made in-
visible from the rest of the computer system. The PCM
memory controller is in charge of the PA-to-PCMA trans-
lation . Hiding PCMA alone does not prevent a malicious
user to blindly overwrite some PCM memory blocks. There-
fore in the secure PCM-based main memory, PA-to-PCMA
translation is continuously modified through a random pro-
cess. This prevents a malicious user to overwrite some PCM
memory words, it also uniformizes the write pressure on the
overall memory for every possible type of workloads. For
implementing the PA-to-PCMA translation, the PCM mem-
ory controller implements a translation table and needs an
efficient random number generator. Our study shows that
for PCM memory components with write endurance in the
108 − 109 range, associating a single translation table entry
with a 4K memory blocks region should be sufficient to en-
sure that the resulting PCM memory would reach 74-83 %
of the expected total memory write endurance if writes were
uniformly distributed on the main memory while generating
an extra 12.5 % writes on the PCM memory.
2. Deconstructing the security of Region
Based Start-Gap scheme
2.1 The start-gap scheme
The start-gap scheme proposed in [2] considers dynamic
PA-to-PCMA translation that varies during the lifetime of
the computer. PA is translated at run-time in PCMA through
a logic function and this function is periodically slightly
modified every N memory block writes on the PCM memory
. In [2], N=100 is considered. Thus the PA-to-PCMA trans-
lation does not remain constant; at each parameter change,
PA-to-PCMA translation is conserved for every physical mem-
ory block, apart one.
The start-gap scheme tends to smooth the distribution of
writes on the PCM memory. However, for applications pre-
senting spatial locality on memory writes, the initial start-
gap scheme does not smoothly equalize the write charge on
the PCM memory. Qureshi et al. [2] augments their initial
start-gap scheme with a pseudo-randomization of the PA-
to-PCMA translation. A Fleistel network function is first
applied on PA and is followed by the start-gap mechanism.
This overall scheme is shown to smoothly average the write
pressure on the overall memory for a significant set of bench-
marks, since it eliminates spatial locality on PCM memory
writes.
Pointing out the security hole associated with malicious
overwrite attacks, Qureshi et al. [2] improve their scheme
with applying start-gap to memory regions instead of the
whole memory. The size R (measured in memory blocks of
the region is determined in order to ensure that the PCM
address of a physical memory block will be modified before
Wmax writes on the region; Wmax being the write endurance
of the PCM components. That is R < Wmax
100
. If the pa-
rameters of the Fleistel network function are unknown from
the attacker (e.g. personalized for each machine at man-
ufacturing time without any external access to read them)
then this region-based stat-gap scheme (RBSG) should al-
low the PCM main memory to survive several months to
a malicious attack consisting in constantly overwriting the
same physical memory address.
The write traffic overhead of the start-gap scheme is very
limited: one extra PCM memory block write per 100 physi-
cal writes.
2.2 Deconstructing the region based start-
gap scheme security
2.2.1 Birthday paradox attack
Unfortunately, the RBSG scheme would not survive a
slightly more malicious attack using the birthday paradox.
If one picks random elements in a set of X elements then
sequences with far less than X elements are very likely to ex-
hibit pairs of equal elements: in a group of 24 persons, there
is in average at least one pair of persons having the same
birthday. For a set of 256K elements (resp. 64M), picking
in average 645 (resp. 7230) random elements is sufficient to
exhibit a pair of equal samples in a set of 218 (resp. 226
) elements. Through leveraging this property, an attacker
could significantly reduce the time needed to overwrite some
memory block in the PCM memory.
A ”birthday paradox” attack on a PCM memory would
consist simply in overwriting the same physical block Wmax
times, then randomly picking another physical memory etc.
To counteract the delayed write policy suggested in [2], one
has simply to interleave 16 write flows.
Our estimation for the example illustrating [2] is that,
assuming a 4 GBbytes/s write bandwidth, 4 hours in av-
erage would be sufficient for a ”birthday paradox attack”
for overwriting some block in the considered 16GB PCM
main memory, while the theoretical write endurance of the
overall memory should be 4 years. The attack could be im-
plemented at user level without sophisticated knowledge of
the intrinsics of the memory structure and/or flaws in the
operating system.
2.2.2 Sandbagging RBSG is unpractical
One could try to improve the endurance of the RBSG
scheme to birthday paradox attacks through decreasing the
size of the regions in RBSG. Thus the size of the region could
be decreased in order that the PA-to-PCMA translation of
a block is guaranteed to be modified after at most Wmax
I
writes on the region. If the region features R blocks then
one should enforce R < Wmax
100I
For I in the range of 8-16, this would make the ”birthday
paradox” attack unpractical, but would bring back practi-
cality to brute force attacks consisting in overwriting always
the same physical memory: using I=8 in the example il-
lustrating [2] reduces the endurance interval of the PCM
memory from 4 months to 2 weeks.
Moreover, if PCM components are used as main memory,
a page mode as on DRAM would be needed order to fully
exploit memory spatial locality on memory reads. To imple-
ment such a page mode, (for instance 4 Kbytes page ), the
overall page should move at the same time, leading the write
overhead of the RBSG scheme to the read and write of one
page every N writes. To maintain a reasonable write band-
width overhead, N should be in the order of 1000 instead of
100. This would further reduce the number of location for
a block in a region: if the region features P pages then one
should guarantee P < Wmax
1000I
.
Using I=8 in the example illustrating [2] reduces the en-
durance interval of the PCM memory to an overwrite attack
is further reduced by a factor 10, i.e., to one and a half day.
2.3 Analysis of RBSG weaknesses
To resist to an overwrite attack, the PA-to-PCMA trans-
lation must be modified dynamically at execution time.
The first weakness of the RBSG scheme as described in [2]
is associated with a faulty evaluation of this constraint; the
authors assumed that dimensioning regions in order that the
PA-to-PCMA translation of any physical block is modified
before the write endurance of the associated PCM block
is reached would be sufficient. Unfortunately the birthday
paradox provides an opportunity of an efficient attack.
The second and more fundamental weakness of the RBSG
scheme lies in the definition of the region-based start-gap
scheme by itself. The PCM memory is statically divided in
regions and the PA-to-PCMA translation local scheme is pe-
riodic. The attacker is guaranteed that the naive overwrite
of the same physical memory block will result in writing al-
ways on the same region in the memory: the endurance of
the whole PCM memory to a naive attack is limited to the
endurance of a single region. The need to resist to the birth-
day paradox attack as well as the need for a page mode to
ensure high read bandwidth reduce the practical number of
PCM blocks on which a physical block can be mapped. Thus
the practical endurance to overwrite attack of the whole
PCM memory is only a small fraction of the overall the-
oretical endurance of the PCM memory.
3. A secure PCM-based main memory
3.1 Security principles
3.1.1 Invisible PA-to-PCMA translation is required
If a malicious attacker knows the PA-to-PCMA transla-
tion, then for a given PCM memory block B, he/she is able
to figure out the address of the physical memory block that
is mapped on B. If the PA-to-PCMA translation is made
invisible from the outside of the PCM memory then the at-
tacker can not retrieve the address of the physical memory
block mapped on a given memory block. Figure 1 illustrates
this invisibility: the computer system manipulates data in
the physical address space, but has no access to the PCM
address.
3.1.2 PA-to-PCMA translations must dynamically change
Our analysis of the RBSG scheme has shown that, in or-
der to resist a birthday paradox attack, the PA-to-PCMA
translation of any physical block B has to be modified with
a frequency largely higher than one time every W max pos-
sible writes on B.
The PA-to-PCMA translation changes should be com-
pletely unpredictable from the outside of the PCM mem-
ory; in particular there should be no restrictions on the new
translation. Through limiting the translation change possi-
bility to a single region, the RBSG scheme is providing an
overwrite attack possibility.
3.2 Principles of a practical secure PCM-
based main memory
3.2.1 PA-to-PCMA translation
In the secure PCM-based main memory we propose, the
PA-to-PCMA translation is performed by the PCM-memory
controller through the use of a translation table. For a phys-
ical memory block B, the address of the corresponding PCM
block is computed from an entry read in the translation ta-
ble and the address B. The PA-to-PCMA translation must
perform a one-to-one address translation from the physical
address space to PCM address space.
The simplest mapping would be to associate a translation
table entry with each physical memory block and ensuring
that the translation is a one-to-one block mapping. Such
one-to-one block mapping appears as unpractical: for in-
stance 256M entries would be needed to map a 16 GBytes
memory using 64 bytes memory blocks, leading to an in-
direct translation table requiring approximately a gigabyte
of storage in the PCM memory controller to implement the
translation table. Instead, we associate a single translation
table entry with a region of R contiguous memory blocks;
for instance if 4K contiguous memory blocks are mapped by
a single entry, 64K entries are sufficient to map 16 GBytes.
PA-to-PCMA region address translation.
Initializing at boot time the translation table T with a
one-to-one region mapping is unpractical. Instead of such
an initialization, we assume that at initialization time, the
translation table T is initialized with only zeros, but that
some computation is performed at run-time in addition to
the read of the translation table. If memory regions are
numbered from 0 to N-1, the translation is performed as
follows: region B in physical memory is mapped onto re-
gion (T(B).address xor B xor R init), where R init is
a random number generated at initialization time.
PA-to-PCMA region displacement translation.
The use of a single entry to map a complete region of the
physical memory could lead to a possible overwrite attack
on trying to write a specific block in all the regions, for in-
stance the first block. In order to avoid such an attack, the
displacement in the region is also translated. Physical mem-
ory block X in region B is mapped onto block ( T(B).disp
xor X xor D init ) in region (T(B).address xor B xor
D init). As R init, D init is a random number generated
at initialization time. This PA-to-PCMA translation is il-
lustrated on Figure 2.
More complex translation functions replacing D init and
R init by functions randomly parameterized at initialization
time can be considered.
3.2.2 Dynamically changing PA-to-PCMA transla-
tion
In order to avoid blind overwrite attacks, the PA-to-PCMA
translation must be continuously modified. More precisely,
only writes represent an issue. Therefore, the PA-to-PCMA
translation modification is triggered randomly and only on
memory writes.
This random triggering is particularly important: As an
example, if the PA-to-PCMA translation change occurs peri-
odically on writes, for instance every 10 writes, an attacker
could repeat the sequence of nine consecutive writes on phys-
ical block B, one write on physical block C. Physical block C
moves in the PCM memory, but block B remains on the same
PCM memory location that can be easily overwritten.
How to modify PA-to-PCMA translation.
Modifying the PA-to-PCMA translation for a physical re-
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Figure 1: Physical memory address space and PCM memory address space
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Figure 2: PA-to-PCMA translation
gion B is implementing through swapping the translations
for two physical regions. This guarantees that the PA-to-
PCMA translation remains a one-to-one mapping. The re-
gion swapping induces the modification of two entries in the
translation table as described below.
A random physical region B’ is chosen and the PA-to-
PCMA translations of B and B’ are exchanged, i.e.,
T(B).address := old(T(B’).address) xor B’ xor B and
T(B’).address := old(T(B).address) xor B’ xor B.
At the same time, displacement translations inside blocks B
and B’ are also modified,: T(B).disp: =old(T(B)).disp
xor RAND and T(B’).disp: =old(T(B’)).disp xor
RAND where RAND is randomly selected 1.
The two memory regions in the PCM memory have to
read and swapped accordingly.
Frequency of PA-to-PCMA translation modifications.
The cost of a PA-to-PCMA translation modification is
proportional to the size R of a region in the memory. The
two swapped regions have to be read and rewritten, i.e., a
PA-to-PCMA translation modification induces 2 R memory
block reads and 2 R memory block writes.
Therefore, the frequency of the address translation mod-
ification should be chosen in order to maintain the total
overhead to a reasonable level. In this study, we arbitrar-
ily estimate that inducing in average one extra write on the
PCM memory per 8 effective writes would be acceptable.
That is, in average one out of 16 R physical memory block
1The same RAND is used since it allows to exchange the
blocks one per one among the B and B’ regions.
writes can trigger a PA-to-PCMA address translation mod-
ification. Therefore on receiving a write on a physical mem-
ory block, the modification of its PA-to-PCMA translation
is randomly triggered with probability 1
16R
.
3.3 Putting all together in the memory con-
troller
The design of a secure PCM-based main memory lead to
several constraints inside the memory controller.
3.3.1 Write endurance and region size
The principles above in Section 3.2 lead to the design of
a PCM-based main memory on which an overwrite attack
would only be able to consecutively write the same mem-
ory block in average 16R times before the physical block is
moved in another PCM memory block. In practice, a write
attack could succeed in significantly reducing the lifetime of
the memory, if 16R is not small with respect to the write
endurance of the cells.
We run simulations of an overwrite attack on a 16 GBytes
PCM memory i.e., 228 64-byte blocks. Regions of respec-
tively 64K, 4K and 256 memory blocks were considered.
If the memory features a write endurance of Wmax = 2
E
writes, then the theoretical write endurance of a uniformly
accessed PCM memory is 228+E .
With a write endurance of only 8 Megawrites (223) per
cell, using 64K memory blocks per region is not an option:
some memory blocks would be destroyed by a brute force
overwrite attack in less than a billion (230) writes. With 4K
memory blocks regions, the PCM memory would be able to
support an attack consisting of up to 38 % of the theoretical
251 writes. With 256 memory block regions, this ratio would
increase up to 71 %.
If the write endurance is 128 Megawrites per cell (227)
then these respective ratios become 38 % for 64K memory
blocks regions, 74 % for 4K memory blocks region and 85 %
for 256 memory blocks region for a theoretical maximum of
88.88 % since in average one extra block write is triggered
for 8 physical memory writes.
If the write endurance is 1 Gigawrites per cell (230) then
these ratios become 65 % , 83 % and 86% for 64K, 4K and
256 memory block regions respectively.
Therefore, if the technology is able to ensure write en-
durance in the billion range then even very large regions
could be considered for PA-to-PCM translations.
3.3.2 Memory controller constraints
The secure PCM main memory would need to integrate
extra hardware in the memory controller to implement the
secure PA-to-PCMA translation.
Memory storage volume.
The storage volume of the PCM memory controller is a
major issue. The main component is the translation table
that features an entry per memory region. For a 16 GB
memory, the use of regions of 256 64-bytes blocks would lead
to 1 M entries, each entry featuring the address of region (20
bits) and a displacement in the region (8 bits) i.e. a total
of 28 bits. The total storage cost of the translation table
would be 3.5 Megabytes. Using larger granularity regions
for instance 4K 64-byte blocks would lead to a much smaller
224 Kbytes translation table.
For a 256 GB memory, using 4K 64-bytes blocks regions
would still appear possible since it would lead to a 4 Megabytes
translation table. For such a 256 GB memory and 64K 64-
byte blocks regions would only necessitate 256 Kbytes for
the translation table.
Swapping memory regions logic.
The memory controller has to handle the important func-
tion of swapping two memory regions on a PA-to-PCMA
translation change. This induces a large number of memory
reads and writes. An atomic swap of the two memory re-
gions would stop the normal read and write accesses by the
computer system . This would not unacceptable.
Therefore the memory controller must feature logic to
interleave blocks swapping with the normal flow of reads
and writes from the computer system. The logic must be
able to handle the case where a normal write is overwrit-
ing a block belonging to one of the memory regions being
swapped. Moreover this normal flow of writes may randomly
trigger new region swaps; the memory controller should be
able to buffer these swaps.
The priority on writes must be dynamically adapted in
order to maintain a limited number of regions waiting for
swaps, for example at most 8 swaps. As an example, we
tested a policy randomly splitting the write priority to 1/4th
for region swapping and 3/4th for normal write flow when
less than 4 region swaps are waiting and one half for region
swapping and one half for normal write flow when 4 or more
region swaps. On an experiment on 240 writes and assuming
a continuous saturated write flow from the computer system,
there was never more then 8 waiting region swaps.
Extra PA-to-PCMA translation latency.
The extra access time to main memory due to PA-to-
PCMA translation is essentially due to the read of the PA-
to-PCMA translation table. This table will be implemented
as a SRAM table in the memory controller. For a 16 GB
memory using 4K 64-byte blocks region, the read access time
of a 224Kbytes SRAM memory would in the range of 3-5
processor cycles and would be marginal compared with the
overall main memory access time.
The random number generator.
Our secure PCM-based main memory will be able to resist
to an overwrite attack if no one is able to follow or recon-
struct the PA-to-PCMA translation process. Our proposal
heavily relies on a random number generator. The security
of our proposal also depends of the security of this random
number generator.
One can remark that the output of the random number
generation used in our memory controller cannot be directly
observed from the outside of the PCM memory. There-
fore different possible schemes could be implemented ranging
from a true hardware random generator to a simpler algo-
rithmic pseudo-random number generator personalized with
a huge key at manufacturing time.
3.4 A secure PCM main memory might be-
come practical in a few years
A need for large write endurance per cell.
A rule of thumb that has been approximately respected for
the past 10 years has been that in general purpose computer
systems, the processor was able to write its complete main
memory in a second. That is if a system features X GBytes,
its achievable memory write bandwidth is in the X GBytes/s
range.
This rule of thumb is very useful to determine at which
write endurance threshold, the PCM technology will become
reliable enough to consider using it as main memory for com-
puter systems. As Qureshi et al [2], we approximate a year
by 225 seconds. Therefore, a memory system randomly and
uniformly exercised at full write bandwidth will necessitate
a endurance per cell of 225 writes per cell and per year of
expected life of the system. That is a write endurance per
cell of 256 Megawrites for 8 years and 1 Gigawrites for 32
years.
Economic feasibility of PCM main memory.
If within a few years, the write endurance per cell on PCM
components reach a billion writes then it would become fea-
sible to build 16 GBytes (or larger) memory using compar-
atively very small PA-to-PCMA translation table (for in-
stance, using 64K blocks memory regions): as mentioned
above, the secure PCM memory would be able to survive to
an overwrite attack at a full 16GBytes/s write bandwidth
for 65 % of an expected lifetime of 32 years.
Page mode is compatible with security.
If PCM memories are used as main memory then a page
mode would be interesting as on current DRAM to limit
the access latency and increase bandwidth when the mem-
ory read requests exhibit high spatial locality. Our PA-
to-PCMA translation scheme is compatible with such page
mode since regions are large enough to accommodate large
page, even split across several PCM components.
Limiting extra write traffic overhead.
In this study, we have considered that the overwrite traf-
fic associated with PA-to-PCMA translation modification
could be as large as 1extra PCM block write per 8 physical
memory block writes. This overhead can be reduced by de-
creasing the probability of triggering a PA-to-PCMA trans-
lation. This would reduce the total endurance of the system
to the overwrite, but may still remain acceptable if the cell
write endurance is large. For instance, for a 16GBytes mem-
ory, if the cell endurance is 256 Megawrites and 64K blocks
memory regions are used then the secure PCM memory still
survives a full 16 GBs/s bandwidth overwrite attack for 28
% of its 8 years expected lifetime.
4. Conclusion
If the promises of the PCM technology are fulfilled (4X
higher integration density, 1 billion write endurance per cell,
access time in the same range as DRAMs, dynamic energy
consumption in the same range as DRAMs) then it will be-
come economically feasible to build a main memory from
PCM memory component in the next few years. Such a
PCM-based main memory will particularly be attractive due
to its very low static energy consumption. However to con-
sider such a memory for an industry product , the PCM
based memory would have to be able to resist to software
overwrite attacks targeting its physical destruction.
In this paper, we have proposed a first secure PCM based
main memory that will resist to overwrite attacks . By hid-
ing the effective PCM memory address from the rest of the
computer system and continuously and randomly moving
the physical memory blocks in PCM memory, overwrite at-
tacks are made impossible. The proposed PA-to-PCMA
translation scheme uniformizes and randomizes the write
flow on PCM memory for malicious overwrite attacks as well
as conventional non malicious applications. Our scheme re-
quires some hardware overhead in the memory controller
(essentially a PA-to-PCMA translation table, the memory
region swapping logic and a random number generator). But
it brings the practical write endurance of the overall PCM
main memory in 70-85 % of the theoretical write endurance
of a uniformly accessed PCM memory.
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